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Kunstler: Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System. By Monroe H. Freedman

BOOK REVIEW
LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM.

By MONROE H.

FREED-

New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1975. Pp.
270. $12.50.
Reviewed by William M. Kunstler**
Since Watergate, most Americans have entertained serious
doubts about the ethical standards of lawyers. As scores of attorneys, many in highly prominent positions, were revealed to be
either outright crooks or, at the very least, easily corruptible
human beings, public confidence in the integrity of the bar visibly
waned. It is probably not out of line to speculate that at no other
time in the country's history have lawyers been less in favor than
they are today.
While Dean Freedman's book is devoted primarily to one
aspect of legal ethics, namely those of the trial lawyer, it comes
at a most fortuitous time. If it does nothing else, it may well
stimulate heated discussion, both in and out of the profession, at
a moment in our national experience when such colloquy is the
very minimum we can expect. While I do not believe, for an
instant, that much if anything will change because of this hopedfor dialogue, I think that it is good for it to take place, if only to
slow down the dry rot somewhat.
The adversary process that characterizes the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence has been universally extolled as the
most efficient nonscientific method of isolating the truth of any
matter in dispute. In reality, it is simply a convenient modus
operandi by which competing theoretical illusions are presented
to so-called factfinders for their selection. To phrase it another
way, it amounts to a highly stylized version of grab bag, with high
pressure salespersons vociferously pushing their unseen wares on
confused shoppers. What emerges so often is rarely truth but that
which one side or the other seeks to palm off as truth.
In essence, this is the corner of the law which Freedman has
chosen to examine, almost microscopically. With the exception of
MAN.*
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some rambling excursions to such provocative topics as, to use the
shorthand of chapter headings, "Certification of Trial Lawyers,"
"The Myth of British Superiority" and "The Duty to Chase
Ambulances," he steadfastly pursues his major thesis, namely,
that the trial attorney's duty to the client transcends any he or
she might owe to the court, good manners, or the truth itself.
Since I subscribe wholeheartedly to this concept, and, indeed,
am one of the examples he uses to prove his point, I can hardly
be expected to be critical of it. But I do think that I have some
sort of an obligation to advance the rationale for my conclusions,
even though, as I suspect, it may differ markedly from that
motivating the author, who seems to have a bedrock faith in the
system that I cannot bring myself to share.
In a relatively ideal society, I suppose that I would prefer
that the trial process actually be a mutual search for the truth,
conducted cooperatively by the defense and prosecution with
grace and civility. Under our present system, however, the exclusionary rules of evidence, the prompting of perjury, and the deft
use of cross-examination to destroy the honest opposing witness,
to name but a few roadblocks mentioned by the author, serve to
obfuscate truth and create the present charade of deceptive
courtroom competition. I firmly believe that the American legal
institution is deliberately, designed and maintained in order to
inhibit, by any means necessary, anyone who even vaguely
threatens the status quo. Thus, I think that attorneys representing individuals who do challenge society's conventional wisdom
must be fully prepared to pit fire against fire if they are to have
any chance to save their clients.
In other words, the legal institution is just as reformable as
the overall system of which it is a major component. Its role, as
Charles Reich eloquently points out in the first part of his book,
The Greening of America,' is to control all those who might conceivably upset the apple cart by altering existing social, political
or, most of all, economic norms. The methods by which such
control is exercised are frequently barbaric, inhumane, and coldblooded, and no amount of tinkering by liberals has ever been
able to prevent their widespread application. If any proof of this
was necessary, it can be seen in the origins of Senate Bill S-1,1
1. C. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA 87-128 (1970).
2. S.1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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known colloquially as "Nixon's Revenge," which will, if enacted,
legalize a form of neofascism.
So what then is the trial lawyer, who honestly believes that
he or she understands the true nature and intent of the institution, to do when asked to defend someone who in all likelihood is
about to be crushed by its strictures? One obvious answer, of
course, is to avoid the problem entirely by refusing to represent
such pariahs. Another is to suppress your sensibilities and play
the game for as long as you can stand it or until you become so
jaded that you lose sight of the true nature of what you are doing.
Then there are those whose principles are stronger than their
instinct for self-preservation who decide to take the high road of
client representation that must, under existing conditions,
exclude every other interest.
Freedman presents one particularly graphic hypothetical to
illustrate the moral dilemmas and legal duties involved in proper
client representation. 3 The case involves a woman who is allegedly raped by a service station attendant. As the defense lawyer
you find that your client has been tried and acquitted for a similar crime in California some time ago, that the story he is going
to tell the court of her acquiescence to the sexual intercourse is
untrue, and that the woman's account of the facts substantiating a forcible rape is correct. In addition, the woman is 22 years
old, is the upstanding daughter of a local banker, and is engaged
to marry a young minister in town.
Now the tough part. You discover that this woman has had
two previous romances. Her first boyfriend refuses to tell you
anything relevant about their relationship. The second, however,
is a very bitter former suitor who appears eager to testify that
they had sexual intercourse frequently and that, during their time
together, she behaved in a provocative fashion toward strange
men. He comments, "She got what she deserved." The question
is whether you as a defense attorney put this man on the stand
to present testimony which will suggest strongly that the complainant is lying when, in actuality, you know that her testimony
is truthful and accurate. Freedman indicates, and I agree, that
the lawyer who is doing a proper job of representing the client
must put this second individual on the stand, no matter how
personally reprehensible the lawyer finds the testimony and re3. Pp. 43-49.
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gardless of the probable disastrous effect that it will have on the
reputation of the woman, her family, and friends. This is not a
particularly pleasant dilemma to face, and those who, like myself, do not feel they can elect such a choice should not attempt
to represent clients in these types of cases. If one does take such
a case, however, to do anything less than attempt to destroy the
truthful witness would be to defend the client's interests improperly. On the personal side, however, I must state that because
of my own sensibilities I could never take such a case. I would
refuse to do so if asked.
As Freedman points out, with this and other perplexing examples, the road of proper client representation is a rocky one
indeed. Lawyers who decide to walk it so often find themselves
hauled before grievance committees, sidetracked by disciplinary
proceedings, indicted for crime, or, at the very least, ostracized
by their fellow practitioners who fear the leper's touch. The bar,
organized or not, is quick to recognize the mailed fist inside the
velvet gloves worn by the hands that feed it, and reacts accordingly.
In order to disguise the real nature of this process, the legal
establishment has surrounded itself with a panoply of highsounding canons, codes, and standards. More than half of Dean
Freedman's book is devoted to a presentation and analysis of
these rather pretentious rules of conduct, 4 some of which, such as
the proscriptions against public comment about pending cases,'
are blatantly unconstitutional. While they do not make for the
most interesting of reading to anyone but a devotee of paradox
in human affairs, they do illustrate the degree to which a rather
tawdry trade has been glorified into a profession, and how zealous
are its overseers to avoid any slippage.
But the real meat of the book, it seems to me, lies in its
stripping away of some of the protective camouflage which has so
successfully hidden the system from meaningful public scrutiny
for centuries. Unfortunately, lay criticism has almost uniformly
been confined to the alleged unethical activities of certain lawyers
and not to those of the institution itself. The tendency has been
to point the finger at the erring individual and to accept the bar's
self-policing procedures as proof positive of the validity of its own
4. Pp. 127-238, 249-63.
5. Pp. 217-19.
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morality claims. As a result, a handful of small-time fast buck
operators, some political figures whose unlawful activities have
been widely disclosed, and the attorneys for the unpopular have
generally been the only ones to have felt the lash of suspension
or disbarment. On the other hand, lawyers who assist giant corporations in finding ways around the antitrust or pure food and drug
laws, prosecutors who have suppressed or fabricated evidence,
and judges who have openly violated their oaths of office not only
do not have to worry about deserved retribution, but are always
found among the most highly respected members of their communities.
In his recent film, Special Section, Constantin Costa-Gavras
notes, with somewhat ingenuous surprise, that none of the Vichy
judges who openly subverted fundamental French law in order to
placate their Nazi occupiers during World War II was ever punished, even though their actions resulted in the legal lynchings of
hundreds of their compatriots. Americans, whose most pervasive
national characteristics seem to be their lack of memory and
isolation from reality, would probably be just as naively shocked
at the virtual blanket immunity that shields lawyers, prosecutors, and judges from punishment for acts which belie every professed creed of our society. Even when the tip of the iceberg is
momentarily visible, as during the Watergate crisis, our collective
inactivity more than proves the essential validity of one commentator's quip that nothing constructive would come out of the
Nixon debacle-and, inferentially, from any other revelations of
power or money corruption in high places-because, in America,
"it's always darkest before the yawn."'
Earlier in this review, I mentioned that lawyers who do not
bend to the system run serious risks in remaining upright. While
I wish that Dean Freedman had devoted much more space to this
issue, he does roundly condemn the practice of utilizing
ostensibly ethical principles to punish those who most exemplify
the professed ideals of the legal establishment.7 In his words: "In
attacking zealous advocacy, we not only do damage to the public
interest, but we also endanger a precious safeguard that any one
of us may have occasion to call upon if we should come to need
our own champion against a hostile world."' I am not sure that
6. Safire, The Pendulum, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1973, at 43, col. 1.
7. Pp. 16-24.
8. P. 24.
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his warning will have any currency among, say, those who run the
American Bar Association, but, with S-1 lurking in our future,'
it should not be taken lightly by the rest of us.
9. See, e.g., Voorhees, The Battle Over the Criminal Code, 59 JUDICATURE 268 (1976).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol4/iss3/13

6

